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D I A L O G U E
Recent Developments 
in Climate Justice
Summary
Climate justice can be defined generally as addressing 
the disproportionate burden of climate change impacts 
on poor and marginalized communities . It seeks to 
promote more equitable allocation of these burdens at 
the local, national, and global levels through proactive 
regulatory initiatives and reactive judicial remedies 
that draw on international human rights and domes-
tic environmental justice theories . Yet, efforts to define 
climate justice as a field of inquiry remain elusive and 
underinclusive; a recent book, Climate Justice: Case 
Studies in Global and Regional Governance 
Challenges (ELI Press 2016), seeks to fill that void 
by providing an overview of the landscape of climate 
justice from a variety of legal and geographic perspec-
tives . On March 10, 2017, ELI convened the book’s 
editor and three contributing authors to discuss cur-
rent developments . Below, we present a transcript of 
the seminar, which has been edited for style, clarity, 
and space considerations .
Rachel Jean-Baptiste (moderator) is a Senior Attorney at 
the Environmental Law Institute .
Randall S. Abate is the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs 
and Professor of Law at Florida A&M College of Law .
Maria Antonia Tigre is a Senior Attorney in the
Environment Program at the Cyrus R . Vance Center for 
International Justice .
Dr. Patricia Ferreira is a Law Foundation of Ontario 
Scholar, Windsor Law, and a Fellow at the Center for 
International Governance Innovation, Canada .
Dr. Wil Burns is founding Co-Director of the Forum 
for Climate Engineering Assessment at the School of 
International Service, American University .
Rachel Jean-Baptiste: Today, we are discussing climate 
justice, with a focus on the volume Climate Justice: Case 
Studies in Global and Regional Governance Challenges .1 The 
book draws on 29 contributors from 16 different nations, 
and offers proposed solutions to a variety of regulatory 
1 . Climate Justice: Case Studies in Global and Regional Governance 
Challenges (Randall S . Abate ed ., ELI Press 2016) .
obstacles under international law, U .S . law, and foreign 
domestic law . I am pleased that we have speakers on a few 
of those topics, including the book’s editor, as well as three 
of the contributing authors .
Randall S . Abate is the associate dean for academic 
affairs and professor of law at Florida A&M College of 
Law . He is our moderator and the editor of Climate Jus-
tice . He will be talking about atmospheric trust litigation . 
Next, will be Maria Antonia Tigre . She is a senior attor-
ney in the environmental law program at the Cyrus R . 
Vance Center for International Justice . She will focus on 
the global repercussions of the Dutch case Urgenda Foun-
dation .2 Next, will be Dr . Patricia Ferreira . She is the Law 
Foundation of Ontario Scholar at Windsor Law, Canada . 
She will address the Paris Agreement3 and the concept of 
differentiation . Last but not least is Dr . Wil Burns . He is 
the founding co-director of the Forum for Climate Engi-
neering Assessment at the School of International Service, 
American University, and he is also a senior fellow at the 
Centre for International Governance Innovation’s Interna-
tional Law Research Program . He will discuss the human 
rights dimensions of bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) .
I. Atmospheric Trust Litigation: 
Pipe Dream or Pipeline to Justice 
for Future Generations?
Randall S. Abate: It is great to see such robust interest in 
this topic . This book was truly a labor of love, with experts 
from around the world on different aspects of what cli-
mate justice means . And this panel is a snapshot of the 
coverage of the book to give a sense of different ways in 
which climate justice has manifested itself in the courts, 
and through international treaty negotiations and interna-
tional human rights frameworks .
I am going to focus on a case that has drawn significant 
attention in the United States . In an era in which we are a 
bit depressed as environmental lawyers, seeing some over-
whelming challenges on the horizon, one case has brought 
a glimmer of hope to our cause . That case is Juliana v. 
2 . Urgenda Foundation v . State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment), Den Haag [Hague District Court] 24 juni 2015, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (Stichting Urgenda/Nederlanden) .
3 . Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st 
Sess ., U .N . Doc . FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add .1 (Dec . 12, 2015), http://un-
fccc .int/files/home/application/pdf/paris_agreement .pdf .
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United States,4 which is an atmospheric trust case that has 
survived a motion to dismiss and is set for trial in the U .S . 
District Court for the District of Oregon . I want to pro-
vide context for how we got to climate justice litigation in 
the United States and then more specifically atmospheric 
trust litigation .
To do that, we must start from the proposition that 
environmental law used to be about environmental 
resources . It was not about humans until the environmen-
tal justice movement was launched . So, the environmental 
justice context has to first be explored as something that 
put a human face on environmental regulation and envi-
ronmental problems, and then how that transformed into 
the climate justice domain, and then more specifically the 
atmospheric trust litigation that we are seeing now .
Environmental justice took hold in the late 1980s in the 
United States . There had been two decades of very success-
ful environmental enforcement to protect resources—air, 
water, land, and endangered species . And then, ultimately, 
there was an awareness that environmental problems go 
well beyond the integrity of the resources themselves . Envi-
ronmental problems have human dimensions . This was 
initially brought to light through disproportionate impacts 
on minority communities, particularly African-American 
communities, who were bearing an unfair burden of envi-
ronmental problems compared to the majority population .
This awareness of the human rights dimensions of envi-
ronmental problems took on this lens of environmental jus-
tice as a way of thinking about environmental protection 
above and beyond the integrity of the resources themselves . 
That field took hold firmly in the 1990s, then encountered 
a roadblock in the courts around 2000, when there was an 
effort to seek Fourteenth Amendment protection for the 
disparate treatment that some communities were experi-
encing from environmental problems compared to others . 
That effort was rejected in the federal courts, and with that 
setback, environmental justice fell off the radar a bit for the 
next 10 years or so .
Environmental justice then came to mean more about 
procedural protections . It did not have as much of a sub-
stantive hold the way proponents had hoped . But recently, 
the Flint, Michigan, case5 and the disproportionate impact 
on minority communities and their drinking water sup-
ply breathed some new life into the environmental justice 
movement . And that development emerged at the same 
time that climate justice had taken hold .
So, climate justice followed in the footsteps of envi-
ronmental justice, and took the ball and ran with it . Cli-
mate justice litigation initially was pursued at the regional 
human rights level . The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights entertained a petition in 2005 involving 
4 . No . 6:15-cv-1517-TC (D . Or . Apr . 8, 2016), http://www .lawandenviron-
ment .com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/5456019-0-10918 .pdf .
5 . The most recent decisions in this litigation are Mays v. City of Flint, No . 
16-2484, 47 ELR 20112 (6th Cir . Sept . 17, 2017), http://www .opn .ca6 .
uscourts .gov/opinions .pdf/17a0212p-06 .pdf, and Boler v. Earley, Nos . 16-
1684/17-1144 (6th Cir . July 28, 2017), http://www .greatlakeslaw .org/files/
Boler_v_Earley_Mays_v_Snyder_6th_Circuit_Opinion .pdf .
the Inuit,6 an indigenous community located throughout 
the Arctic in Canada, Greenland, Russia, and the United 
States . This indigenous community framed what came to 
be known as the “climate change and human rights move-
ment .” The Inuit alleged that there had been an impact 
to their human rights from the United States’ failure to 
become a party to the Kyoto Protocol .7
Ultimately, this case was brought to a commission that 
declined to rule on the petition due to insufficient evidence 
of human rights violations . But the case helped build sig-
nificant awareness in the international community of the 
impacts to these indigenous peoples—their loss of their 
right to be cold, as they called it—from the melting in the 
Arctic caused by climate change, which was accelerated 
by the United States’ failure to regulate climate change . 
Even though they did not secure relief in the international 
human rights domain, the case helped define what cli-
mate justice means and how the legal system needs to have 
mechanisms to acknowledge and remedy the human rights 
impacts of climate change on marginalized communities 
like indigenous peoples and low-lying island nations .
That legal theory was applied in the United States 
through a well-known case in Alaska, Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,8 which was filed shortly 
after the Inuit petition . There was already a progression of 
cases in U .S . courts that was framed on the basis of pub-
lic nuisance . Initially, these claims were brought against 
major power plants throughout the United States . In this 
litigation, states sued major power plants to reduce their 
carbon dioxide emissions from their operations by 20% . 
Collectively, these major power plants in the United States 
were responsible for a significant percentage of U .S . emis-
sions . So, the idea was that the U .S . citizens were not get-
ting desired emissions reductions from the United States’ 
non-participation in international treaty negotiations 
under Kyoto or from federal legislation in the United 
States to address climate regulation, so we took to the 
courts . This was the first step in that effort of climate jus-
tice litigation—to use the judiciary as a way to get some 
kind of climate change regulation and relief from climate 
change impacts .
Initially, it was just brought by states . Then it went 
to affected communities . Victims of Hurricane Katrina 
brought a case based on public nuisance theory for the 
impacts they suffered from the intensity of the hurricane 
and how it displaced them and caused a great deal of harm 
and disruption . The Kivalina case in Alaska was a part of 
this second step .
The Kivalina case was a group of 400 Native Alaskans 
who lived on this narrow strip of land . It was not always 
that narrow, however . Sea-level rise caused coastal erosion, 
which led to their land becoming essentially uninhabit-
6 . Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Re-
lief From Violations Resulting From Global Warming Caused by Acts and 
Omissions of the United States (Dec . 7, 2005) .
7 . Id.
8 . 696 F .3d 849, 42 ELR 20195 (9th Cir . 2012), cert. denied, 133 S . Ct . 2390 
(2013) .
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able . The U .S . Army Corps of Engineers projects that this 
community only has about 10 years to live where they are 
currently located . They brought a case against more than 
20 of the largest multinational oil and gas companies, seek-
ing payment for their relocation cost . They were going to 
have to move only 10 miles away from where they currently 
live, but out of harm’s way so they would not be inundated 
because of their current vulnerability .
That case did not prevail in the courts . And that is some-
thing that I want to focus on in terms of climate justice 
litigation because when we move into atmospheric trust 
litigation, a lot of these same challenges facing the current 
plaintiffs in atmospheric trust litigation, we have already 
seen in the initial waves of climate justice litigation strate-
gies . These obstacles have plagued these plaintiffs and they 
continue to be challenges .
The first obstacle was federal displacement . This refers 
to the fact that the Clean Air Act (CAA)9 is in place at 
the federal level . The theory of federal displacement is that 
litigants should not rely on the common-law system to ask 
the judiciary to fashion remedies that could be obtained 
through the U .S . Congress under existing legislation . 
Thus, the CAA is the statute that should be engaged to 
address climate change . The court’s reasoning was that cli-
mate justice relief, if available, ought to be sought under 
the CAA and not through some theory in the courts under 
common law . That was one ground on which these cases 
have been dismissed .
Another common thorn in the environmental plaintiffs’ 
sides is standing . Standing has been a big concern, and 
particularly the causation element of standing has been a 
significant obstacle in these cases .
The political question doctrine was another challenge 
in the sense that these cases have involved using the court 
system to get climate justice relief . The argument under the 
political question doctrine is that Congress or the execu-
tive branch is better-suited to address climate change and 
its related impacts than the court system . Another related 
point is that the courts are not equipped to address these 
cases . Essentially, the courts lack the expertise to address 
these issues of climate change impacts due to their highly 
scientific nature .
So, atmospheric trust litigation is built on this momen-
tum from environmental justice setting the stage for human 
rights and disproportionate impacts, and then these public 
nuisance suits that set a platform for the idea of climate jus-
tice relief in the courts . And then a retooling of our ancient 
public trust doctrine was necessary to lay the foundation 
for atmospheric trust litigation .
Basically, this line of cases draws on the proposition that 
the public trust doctrine stands for the state as a steward 
of natural resources for the benefit of the public, which 
was limited traditionally to the wet sands in coastal areas 
and the beds of rivers . Essentially, these resources could 
not be alienated and sold to private hands . The state had 
9 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
to manage these resources in a way that is for the benefit 
of the public .
The scope of the doctrine gradually extended to other 
areas beyond the “traditional triad of uses,” as they’re 
called—fishing, navigation, and commerce . The courts 
eventually recognized that those public trust responsibili-
ties in the state extend to wetlands and wildlife, and that 
the public trust doctrine was not as narrow as it was origi-
nally formulated .
And so it was building on that judicial expansion that 
atmospheric trust litigation steps in to suggest that the pub-
lic trust doctrine be extended to mandate the state to be a 
trustee of our atmospheric resources, to protect the integ-
rity of the atmosphere for current and future generations’ 
health and well-being . That’s the theory . Several cases have 
been brought and are currently pending throughout the 
United States at both the federal and state levels applying 
this theory .
The one that I want to draw attention to is the Juliana 
case . What is unique about this case is that it is brought 
by youth plaintiffs residing throughout the United States . 
They are representing current and future generations’ 
interest in the integrity of the atmospheric resource sys-
tem . They are seeking to compel the federal government 
to regulate climate change based on the atmospheric trust 
theory and constitutional law arguments . So, it is really an 
ambitious use of the judiciary to seek relief against govern-
mental entities .
Traditionally under environmental litigation the most 
common citizen efforts for relief would be to seek to com-
pel a governmental entity to execute a non-discretionary 
duty . So, it’s essentially something it had to do anyway, and 
citizens can sue to compel that responsibility . But this is a 
much more ambitious and creative use of a common-law 
theory that is at issue in atmospheric trust litigation .
There are a lot of these kinds of cases going on outside 
the United States, some of which Maria will talk about . 
What I want to draw your attention to is that the Juliana 
case was something that has survived against impossible 
odds . First, the fact that this case survived the motion to 
dismiss is a major victory because the court acknowledged 
that there is not a standing concern, which has been a big 
challenge in these cases . There is also not a political ques-
tion doctrine concern, and this is how the case is able to 
proceed to trial . But most significantly, the court acknowl-
edged that there is a basis for the substantive claims that 
are being made .
Their substantive claims are not just an extension of 
public trust to reach atmospheric resources . They are also 
relying on constitutional arguments to allege that the gov-
ernment is essentially creating constitutional harms by fail-
ing to regulate climate change . The plaintiffs are alleging 
a substantive due process basis for their claim, and they 
are also relying on the Ninth Amendment, which refers to 
rights that are not expressly enumerated .
Under the Ninth Amendment, there is opportunity for 
the judiciary to find new rights that are not expressly con-
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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veyed in the U .S . Constitution . Ultimately, what was most 
powerful about the district court’s reasoning in denying 
the government’s motion to dismiss was the reference to 
the Obergefell v. Hodges decision,10 a U .S . Supreme Court 
case on gay marriage, a reference that used very compelling 
language to convey that a stable climate system is essential 
for the same reason that marriage is essential to our cul-
ture . It’s a platform for the enjoyment of other very impor-
tant rights to life and liberty .
What is really exciting about this case is that it is set to 
proceed to trial in 2018 . The federal government is quite 
concerned and is seeking to intervene to tinker with how 
the case is going to be managed . It is encouraging to see 
that the atmospheric trust theory and the prospects for suc-
cess in this case are gaining a lot of attention and support .
I want to end on a hopeful note in the sense that we 
have seen creative and persistent environmental litigation 
succeed in other contexts . One does not have to look back 
too far in U .S . history to see industries that were seem-
ingly untouchable—for example, lead paint, asbestos, and 
tobacco—and were winning case after case against envi-
ronmental interests . They eventually crumbled because of 
the creativity and persistence of environmental common 
law . It is not too hard to imagine that the fossil fuel indus-
try can easily be the next industry on this list to take a 
big hit from this line of cases that demand responsibility 
for regulation both at the governmental level and at the 
private-sector level .
Ultimately, atmospheric trust litigation theory is only 
meant to address one case at a time . Relief is not meant to 
be systemic, but it is supposed to motivate governmental 
responses to ultimately achieve more of a traditional top-
down remedy .
II. The Dutch Case and 
Global Repercussions
Maria Antonia Tigre: The focus of my presentation is on 
the famous Dutch case that reached a verdict at the end of 
2015, and changed the paradigm for climate change litiga-
tion . I would like to provide a bit of background, as it is 
important to discuss the claims that were brought and the 
decision that was reached .
In the book chapter that I co-wrote with Jennifer 
Huang, who is an international fellow at the Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions, we discussed three of the 
legal implications arising from this case . I will discuss one 
of those here, and also some implications for future climate 
justice litigation .
The Urgenda Foundation is a Netherlands-based envi-
ronmental nonprofit organization . It means “urgent 
agenda .” After two years of preparation, Urgenda brought 
this case along with almost 900 citizens and they sued 
the Dutch government for its ongoing contributions to 
climate change at the end of 2013 . They argued that the 
10 . Obergefell v . Hodges, 576 U .S . __, 135 S . Ct . 2584 (2015) .
Dutch government was not doing enough to regulate and 
curb Dutch greenhouse gas emissions, and for that reason, 
the government was negligent toward its citizens . They 
requested the government cut emissions by at least 25% to 
40% below 1990 levels by 2020 . The current goal is 16% 
from 2005 levels . Although the Netherlands is a small 
country, it is actually a large emitter . It ranks fifth in car-
bon dioxide emissions and it is responsible for 0 .5% of the 
world’s emissions .
The claims were mostly based on Dutch civil law . There 
is an article in the Dutch Civil Code that addresses the 
violation of personal rights, a breach of statutory duty, or 
of an unwritten standard of care .11 According to this arti-
cle, a civil court may determine the applicable standard of 
duty . Because the government is not immune from liability 
under Dutch law, government agencies can be held liable 
as policymakers .
Urgenda claimed that the Dutch government violated 
this statute by not adopting more aggressive emission 
reduction policies that were needed to protect its citizens, 
and they used the science from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) reports12 to provide the facts 
behind global warming . In addition to the domestic law, 
they relied on European Human Rights Law and Inter-
national Environmental Law13 to reinforce those claims . 
In particular, they relied on the objective of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)14 and the long-term goal of limiting global 
warming to 2 degrees Celsius, as well as the preamble of 
the Cancun Agreements,15 which provides that developed 
country Parties must reduce emissions in the range of 25% 
to 40% below 1990 levels to avoid the adverse impacts of 
climate change .
In June 24, 2015, the District Court of The Hague 
issued its decision in favor of Urgenda and rejected all 
of the state’s defenses . In particular, the procedural issue 
that the court addressed first was that Urgenda had stand-
ing, which was in itself a big deal . The court accepted 
Urgenda’s claims that there was a breach of duty of care 
in this case based on the precautionary principle and the 
Netherlands’ commitment under the UNFCCC, as well 
as under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union16 itself . So, they used international law, domestic 
11 . Art . 6:162 BW .
12 . IPCC reports are periodic, international reports that assess the scientific, 
technical, and socioeconomic information concerning climate change, its 
potential effects, and options for adaptation and mitigation .
13 . The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Cancun Agreements .
14 . United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
S . Treaty Doc . No . 102-38, 1771 U .N .T .S . 107 (entered into force Mar . 21, 
1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC] .
15 . Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun 
From 29 November to 10 December 2010—Addendum, Part Two: Action Tak-
en by the Conference of the Parties at Its Sixteenth Session, Decisions Adopted 
by the Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, 16th Sess ., Decision 1/CP .16, 
U .N . Doc . FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add .1 (2011), http://unfccc .int/resource/
docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01 .pdf .
16 . Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2008 O .J . C 115/47 .
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
12-2017 NEWS & ANALYSIS 47 ELR 11009
law, and European Union law as well . The court estab-
lished that there was a legal duty to protect citizens from 
impacts of climate change and that this duty was enforce-
able by the court .
The court cited several components of international 
law including the no-harm rule, the doctrine of hazard-
ous negligence, the principle of fairness, the precaution-
ary principle, and the sustainability principle . The court 
recognized that the Netherlands was partially responsible 
for contributions to climate change . Therefore, the court 
ordered the Dutch government to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by 25% below 1990 levels by 2020 . The 
Dutch government appealed the decision . However, due 
to the procedural rules of the Netherlands, the decision 
is already enforceable, so the government has started to 
comply with it .
The Urgenda case has already had a significant impact 
on national policymaking and public debate . A new cli-
mate bill has already been drafted . Even though the appeal 
is still pending, the decision has already prompted several 
changes and inspired more litigation in other parts of the 
world . In our book chapter, we analyzed three important 
legal issues that have significant implications . Here, I will 
focus on one of those issues: the judicial overreach question .
Many scholars have debated whether the court in 
Urgenda exceeded its judicial authority . Like several other 
systems around the world, the Dutch constitutional sys-
tem consists of three branches and is supported by a system 
of checks and balances in which each branch checks on 
the potential abuse of power by the other branches . Some 
argued that the decision is a threat to the rule of law and 
constitutional democracy, and opens the possibility of an 
activist civil court, as they call it, which would adjudicate 
science-based policymaking that would not necessarily 
represent the majority of the population .
According to those that defend this position, this deci-
sion would likely be overruled by the Dutch Supreme 
Court, as the court cannot obligate the states to create new 
law . This is true under European Union law as well, which 
states that a national court may hold the state liable for any 
emission or failure to act where obligated and also assess 
damages, but it cannot require the state to act .
The opposing view is that the decision is actually 
restoring a constitutional balance . Because the govern-
ment here was negligent toward citizens and failed to do 
enough to protect them, the court will simply be tak-
ing up the slack when the other branches of government 
have failed and have not fully protected the fundamental 
rights that are guaranteed .
One of the problems with this position is that the 
Urgenda decision was precise and detailed, leaving the state 
with very few means of how to achieve it . But the Dutch 
court addressed this issue in its decision, and recognized 
that there was a risk of intrusion into the executive and leg-
islative branches of government . Nevertheless, it concluded 
that Urgenda was not prohibited from enforcing the gov-
ernment’s duty of care in this particular case .
A similar issue was also raised in Pakistan in Leghari 
v. Federation of Pakistan,17 which is a decision from 2015 . 
This case was brought by a farmer based on the govern-
ment’s failure to implement the 2012 National Climate 
Policy and Framework, which was developed to fulfill the 
commitments under the UNFCCC . According to the Bali 
Action Plan18 and the Cancun Agreements, the govern-
ment of Pakistan had to establish some specific domestic 
climate change policy and then implement it . The govern-
ment established the policies in the 2012 policy frame-
work, but did not fully implement them . This farmer 
realized that climate change has led to water scarcity and 
temperature shift, causing a severe impact on food security . 
And the lack of implementation of the framework actually 
worsened these impacts . Instead of seeking compensation, 
Leghari requested the government to promote irrigation 
practices and green energy practices .
The Lahore High Court first noted that climate change 
significantly impacts communities in Pakistan . It reinforced 
the facts of climate change, put those in public record—
which was itself significant in this case—and ruled that the 
delay in implementing the framework offended the consti-
tutional rights to life, including the right to a healthy and 
clean environment and the right to human dignity . The 
Court based its decision on a blend of international climate 
change law and domestic constitutional norms, directly 
linking climate change to human rights . As a result, the 
Court requested the government ministry to take specific 
actions to implement the framework . And the Court, in 
fact, was even more specific than the Dutch court and set 
up specific ways in which the executive branch would have 
to comply with the ruling .
Thus, both of these cases are significant develop-
ments: Urgenda was the first case in Europe in which 
human rights and international law had been used to 
determine a government’s duty of care to its citizens with 
respect to climate change regulation . And the Leghari 
case built on this momentum, and it came from a devel-
oping country, which is also very significant for climate 
justice as a whole .
In both cases, the courts emphasized the obligations of 
the governments to protect their citizens, endorsing the 
facts of climate change, making this public record as well, 
and established that climate change is real and caused by 
human activity, that the impacts are dramatically impact-
ing the world as a whole, and that governments should act . 
They brought a human dimension to environmental law, 
like Randy mentioned, linking human rights with envi-
ronmental law, and with climate change specifically .
The Urgenda case already has some significant implica-
tions for other climate justice cases around the world . I 
want to highlight three of those . The first one is a case 
17 . W .P . No . 25501 (Lahore High Court Sept . 4, 2015) .
18 . Pakistan, Submission by Pakistan: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Ac-
tions by the Developing Countries (Bali Action Plan 1bii) (2011), https://
unfccc .int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/
submission_by_pakistan_on_namas_ghh .pdf .
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in Belgium that was filed in 2015 .19 The model is very 
similar to that of Urgenda . It also involves a coalition of 
citizens that sued the federal and regional governments of 
Belgium for failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . 
They asked the government to reduce by 40% by 2020, 
below 1990 levels .
The other two cases, from New Zealand and Pakistan, 
are both based on the intended nationally determined 
contributions (INDCs), which were presented prior to the 
Paris Agreement . This strategy is a bottom-up approach 
in which developing countries set up their targets to con-
tribute to reducing climate change and establish the ways 
in which they would reach those targets . And the nation-
ally determined contributions (NDCs) already involve 
legal issues that may also be addressed in the courts in the 
future . These two cases were brought by citizens who were 
dissatisfied with the targets that were chosen and set by 
their countries .
The New Zealand case was filed by a law graduate, 
Sarah Thomson .20 She questioned the legality and the rea-
sonableness of the government’s domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions and the INDCs themselves and sought judicial 
review of the government’s climate change policy .
The Pakistan case was brought by a seven-year-old girl, 
Rabab Ali, also following this trend of youth cases brought 
in climate justice .21 She also questioned the validity of the 
INDCs, for their lack of mitigation targets and mitiga-
tion measures, and also linked it to a violation of the fun-
damental constitutional rights, so she asked the court to 
rewrite the INDCs .
There are also cases in Austria, Nigeria, Norway, the 
Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland . But the gist 
here is that we are in a new era of climate action . Climate 
litigation provides ways in which the government and 
its citizens can engage in a dialogue to increase regula-
tory ambitions . It has really broadened the participation 
in climate justice as nongovernment actors are pushing 
governments to do more when more climate action is 
urgently needed .
In response to that trend, courts are starting to be more 
open to those initiatives . I think courts are going beyond 
their traditional role and it is something that is still under 
development . But the role of courts in climate justice is 
evolving and the role of judges in particular is getting rede-
fined . They are starting to play more active roles .
The third point that I wanted to include is that the Paris 
Agreement and the NDCs in particular bring an oppor-
tunity for more action that removes the focus on devel-
oped countries . Through the NDCs, there was innovation 
for broader participation, which is tailored to the specific 
19 . VZW Klimaatzaak v . Kingdom of Belgium et al ., Court of First Instance, 
Brussels [2015] .
20 . Kennedy Warne, Sarah vs the State: Government’s Climate Targets “Illegal, 
Unreasonable, Irrational,” N .Z . Geographic, Nov . 12, 2015, https://www .
nzgeo .com/stories/sarah-vs-the-state-governments-climate-targets-illegal-
unreasonable-irrational .
21 . Our Children’s Trust, Pakistan, Legal Updates, http://ourchildrenstrust .org/
legal/international/Pakistan (last visited Oct . 13, 2017) .
capacities of countries . The key here, I think, is contribu-
tion and collaboration . Climate litigation has been one 
mechanism to promote climate justice . The collective effort 
really should be according to all countries’ capacities .
III. From Justice to Participation: 
The Paris Agreement’s Pragmatic 
Approach to Differentiation
Patricia Ferreira: Often, when one thinks about climate 
justice, what first comes to mind are questions of reme-
dies for those communities that are most affected by the 
impacts of climate change—communities that tend to be 
the poorest and most marginalized, which least contrib-
uted to the climate change problem . Also, we think about 
climate lawsuits against the “carbon majors” or climate 
lawsuits against states, such as the ones discussed by Ran-
dall and Maria .
However, one of the earliest and most enduring debates 
on climate justice is the one addressing the problem of 
how to fairly allocate the burdens and the costs of cli-
mate action between developed and developing countries . 
Countries are extremely asymmetrical when it comes to: 
(1)�their contributions to climate change; (2)�their fi nan-
cial and technological capabilities to address climate chal-
lenge; and (3)� their socioeconomic conditions, or their 
development needs .
The principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and capabilities, or the “principle of differentia-
tion,” has been at the center of this debate in the climate 
regime . For a long time, this debate has been seen from a 
“North against South” perspective . Developing countries 
have accused developed countries of failing to assume 
their greater responsibility to address climate change . 
Greater responsibility because developed countries have 
historically emitted significantly more greenhouse gases, 
but also because developed countries have much greater 
financial and technological capacity to address or to act 
on climate change . Developed countries, for their part, 
have argued that if left unchecked, growing emissions 
from emerging economies would derail their best efforts 
to address climate change .
This North versus South focus became insufficient to 
explain key recent developments in the climate regime as 
exemplified by the evolution of the principle of differen-
tiation . Before the Paris Agreement, emerging economies 
such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa promoted 
differentiation as a tool to promote climate justice even if 
it meant sacrificing broad participation in the multilateral 
climate regime . In Paris, emerging economies have sup-
ported differentiation as an instrument to secure and to 
promote broad participation in the climate regime, while 
no longer promoting the principle as a main tool to secure 
climate justice .
First, I will address the differentiation model of the 
1990s and the UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol . Then, 
I will discuss the new model of differentiation post-
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multilateral climate negotiations for more than a decade . 
This strong emphasis on justice has disrupted the Kyoto 
Protocol and sacrificed participation in the multilateral cli-
mate regime . The Kyoto Protocol ended up covering only 
15% of global emissions, emissions that continue to grow 
significantly, especially in emerging economies . The lon-
ger countries failed to reach a new consensus, the larger 
became the proportion of contributions and capabilities of 
emerging economies .
Indeed, to illustrate this shift in the global asymmetries, 
in the 1990s, a small number of countries in the global 
North were responsible for 86% of the share of cumulative 
or historic carbon emissions while all countries in the global 
South were responsible for only 14% . This is from 1850 to 
1992 . In 2010, however, emerging economies together were 
already responsible for a share of 35% of global emissions, 
while developed countries as a group were responsible for 
33% . All other developing countries together were respon-
sible for 32% of global emissions . China has surpassed the 
United States in terms of carbon dioxide absolute emis-
sions .23 But even in terms of cumulative or historic emis-
sions, emerging economies as a group are responsible for a 
very significant share of global emissions and they are fast 
approaching the same levels of developed countries even in 
historic emissions .
The same shift is happening in terms of economic capa-
bilities or financial capabilities . As an example, China 
now is the second-largest economy in the world, and the 
emerging economies’ collective share of the world gross 
domestic product (GDP) is projected to soon surpass the 
GDP share of developed countries as a group . If we look 
to technological capacity or capabilities in 1992 when 
the UNFCCC was signed, developed countries possessed 
most of the world’s technological capacity . This situation 
has also changed .
In 2011, the World Bank commissioned a study to 
develop a global index of scientific and technological capac-
ity . The findings defied the common perception about the 
limitations of technological capacity in developing coun-
tries . China has climbed from 38th place in the ranking 
in 2001 to third place in 2011; India from 44 to 12; Brazil 
from 39 to 16 . And even South Africa rising from 43rd to 
37th place is still within what’s called the “technologically 
proficient group,” along with many developed countries .
It is true that the emerging economies cannot be placed 
in the same category as developed countries due to their 
development needs, and also because of their lower per 
capita and historic contributions, which Maria mentioned . 
But it is also true that based on the polluter-pays principle 
and the capabilities idea, they will have to accept a mean-
ingful share of climate obligations—one that is differenti-
ated from other developing countries that have much lower 
contributions, much lower capacity, and much greater 
development needs .
23 . John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes US as World’s Biggest CO2 Emit-
ter, The Guardian, June 19, 2007, https://www .theguardian .com/environ-
ment/2007/jun/19/china .usnews .
Copenhagen that was reflected in the Paris Agreement . I 
will conclude by considering some of the implications for 
the way forward .
When countries signed the UNFCCC in 1992, there 
was a striking North versus South dissonance in the way 
that industrialized countries and developing countries 
considered the principle of differentiation . For the South, 
differentiation should primarily reflect the polluter-pays 
principle and the capabilities principle, meaning that 
developed countries responsible for more historic and per 
capita emissions and having greater financial and tech-
nological capacity should pay the costs for climate action 
accordingly . The focus of developing countries therefore 
was strongly in corrective and distributive justice, linked 
to respective contributions, capabilities, but also develop-
ment needs .
Developed countries, however, accepted differentiated 
responsibilities to attract the participation of develop-
ing countries to global climate regulation efforts because 
they could not solve climate change unilaterally or by only 
coordinating among themselves . So, it was a trade off or a 
balance between justice and participation considerations, a 
balance that had worked well in other multilateral environ-
mental agreements . For example, the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,22 which gave 
developing countries longer periods to comply with their 
obligations, in addition to guaranteeing significant capac-
ity building, financial assistance, and technology transfer 
to help with compliance .
But the model of differentiation embraced at the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol was different . It made 
a clear North against South distinction . Developed coun-
tries are called to take the lead on climate action by com-
mitting to mandatory economywide emissions cuts and 
by financing climate action in developing countries . All 
developing countries, including emerging economies, were 
exempted from these central obligations and financial 
commitments, instead of the facilitated compliance and 
capacity-building that had prevailed in other multilateral 
environmental agreements .
The manifestation of differentiation in the climate 
change treaty regime before Paris broke the balance 
between justice and participation considerations that had 
prevailed in other multilateral environmental agreements . 
First, there is a total absence of binding climate commit-
ments for emerging economies . So, if the primary objec-
tive of developed countries had been to use differentiation 
as a tool to enlist the meaningful participation of major 
developing countries, this did not happen in the climate 
regime . Then, famously, the United States rejected the 
terms of the Kyoto Protocol and never ratified the agree-
ment . Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 . 
Other countries such as Japan and Australia did not fully 
meet their targets .
This marked North versus South divide on differentia-
tion was behind the gridlock that virtually froze effective 
22 . 1522 U .N .T .S . 3, 26 I .L .M . 1550 (entered into force Jan . 1, 1989) .
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The outcome of the climate negotiations could have 
been, for example, the creation of a spectrum of obligations 
or a new category for emerging economies with a different 
set of obligations . But this is not exactly what happened . 
We know that the fortune of the multilateral climate 
regime changed in the late 2000s . Air pollution caused by 
the same carbon emissions responsible for climate change 
became a public health issue and a political chicken bone 
in China . In the United States, we had President Barack 
Obama making climate change one of his foreign affairs 
and domestic priorities .
Therefore, the interest of the two largest greenhouse 
gas emitters—one in the global North, one in the global 
South—finally aligned . In 2009, in Copenhagen, despite 
the failure to arrive at a new binding climate agreement, 
the group of emerging economies and the United States 
finally agreed on a path forward on climate action post-
2020 .24 This alignment has enabled this broader global 
consensus on the need and the opportunity to move the 
multilateral climate regime forward .
What we have witnessed is a critical juncture that led 
to the successful negotiation of the 2015 Paris Agreement . 
The Paris Agreement has many strengths and many lim-
itations . But one of those limitations is that the climate 
justice dimension regarding the allocation of responsibili-
ties among countries is not there in the Paris Agreement . 
When one looks closer, this link between contributions to 
climate change, capabilities, and climate obligations was 
not reflected in the text of the Paris Agreement .
The Paris Agreement now has established the hybrid 
regime . There is a set of universal non-differentiated 
obligations, for example common, legally binding obli-
gations to prepare and to communicate periodically the 
NDCs . The reporting is mandatory, but the substance on 
the commitments is voluntary now for both developed 
countries and emerging economies and all developing 
countries, in fact . There is also a common transparency 
framework and a common compliance regime that is 
facilitated by all countries .
But recognizing the normative legacy of the UNFCCC, 
the Paris Agreement has maintained some aspects of the 
North versus South elements of differentiation . Developed 
countries still expressly will take the lead with economy-
wide emissions reduction targets . Developed countries 
shall provide financial resources for developing countries to 
take climate action . And developed countries shall provide 
capacity-building and technology transfer to the develop-
ing countries .
This model has allowed virtual universal participation 
in the Paris Agreement, which has broadly been consid-
ered a diplomatic success . What the Paris Agreement did 
not do was to expressly establish an intermediary set of 
legal responsibilities or obligations for emerging economies 
based on their greater contributions, their greater capabili-
ties, and their lesser development needs, when compared to 
24 . Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmor-
tem, 104 Am . J . Int’l L . 230 (2010) .
other developing countries . Again, the strong emphasis on 
the participation meant a sacrifice of the earlier goal to use 
differentiation to promote climate justice .
So, what are the main takeaways? As the contributions 
and capabilities of emerging economies grew significantly 
over time, especially when compared to other developing 
countries, these countries have changed their position on 
differentiation, favoring a shift from a justice approach to 
differentiation to a more pragmatic approach to differentia-
tion that emphasizes participation .
As described by Lavanya Rajamani, the leading expert 
on differentiation in international environmental law, “The 
climate differentiation, once inspired by principle, is now 
firmly in the realm of practical politics .”25 It was this shift 
in the position of emerging economies that has led to this 
transformation of the principle of differentiation in the cli-
mate regime .
Other takeaways include that we are now further away 
from this idea of climate justice as a correlation between 
contributions to climate change, capabilities to act on cli-
mate, and international climate obligations . Developed 
countries with higher historic and per capita emissions and 
greater financial capacity have no longer the binding obli-
gation to reduce their emissions . Emerging economies with 
growing emissions and growing capabilities are also under 
no obligation, as all mitigation is now voluntary .
There is a silver lining . The Paris Agreement has 
included some innovative institutional features, such as a 
strong transparency framework and periodic stocktaking . 
Those mechanisms may serve as instruments to apply polit-
ical pressure to push both developed countries and emerg-
ing economies to face or to embrace their greater climate 
responsibilities . But how exactly this will play out we still 
do not know, as it will depend on many variables .
One variable is the question of whether we can keep the 
momentum on the multilateral climate regime . We now 
know that this rare global political consensus on climate 
action did not last long, unfortunately . Only one year after 
the signing of the Paris Agreement, we have the presiden-
tial election here in the United States and now a climate 
denier is in the White House . So, the new Administration 
has promised to protect coal and oil jobs to the detriment 
of the global climate regime . U .S . climate action advo-
cates are again bracing for a new wave of climate litigation, 
which is one of the other avenues for climate justice . On 
the flipside, Brazil, China, and India are still on board on 
the climate regime and they may play a much bigger role 
globally with other developed countries .
My argument is that no matter what happens in the 
United States and other developed countries, this old 
North versus South perspective is no longer sufficient to 
explain recent evolutions in international and environmen-
tal law, as exemplified by the evolution of the principle of 
differentiation . Whether this change works for good or for 
25 . Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agree-
ment: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65 Int’l & Comp . 
L .Q . 493 (2016) .
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bad, only time will tell . There is no consensus in the litera-
ture on whether binding legal international obligations are 
more likely to change the behavior, for example, of the soft 
cooperative instruments . What is certain is that participa-
tion and not justice has been the primary driver of the new 
differentiation in the Paris Agreement .
Thus, seeking climate justice will depend a lot more on 
added provisions seeking to protect against human rights 
violations related to climate change, for example, and on 
the response to climate change, which is going to be the 
topic of Wil’s presentation .
IV. BECCS and Human Rights
Wil Burns: In the past decade, there’s been substantial 
focus at the international level on the nexus of human 
rights and climate change . Most of the emphasis during 
this time has been on the potential impacts on human 
rights of climate change itself . However, if one looks 
at the Paris Agreement, in its preambular language that 
addresses human rights, we see a transformation . Instead 
of an emphasis on the potential effects on human rights 
of climactic impacts, there is an emphasis on the potential 
impacts of responses to climate change, including mitiga-
tion and adaptation . However, the Preamble provides little 
guidance as to how we could operationalize that language 
in a way to protect those human rights in terms of discrete 
response measures .
The purpose of my chapter is to present a framework 
for operationalizing the Paris Agreement’s human rights 
language in the context of response measures by focusing 
on an emerging form of climate mitigation characterized 
as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage . BECCS 
can reduce concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmo-
sphere by using carbon-storing feedstocks to produce 
heat, electricity, as well as liquid and gas fuels, coupled 
with carbon capture and sequestration, a process that cap-
tures carbon and seeks to store it either terrestrially or in 
the world’s oceans .
BECCS is denominated as a “negative emissions tech-
nology,” because it can, at least in theory, effectuate a 
permanent net removal of carbon dioxide, as opposed to 
options that merely reduce emissions in the atmosphere . 
While there are only a handful of BECCS projects cur-
rently, 87% of the integrated assessment models of the 
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report26 that provide pathways 
to hold temperatures to below 2 degrees Celsius, the Paris 
target—contemplate wide-scale deployment of BECCS, 
perhaps as much as 10-20 gigatons per year in terms of 
total capture . The Paris Agreement would appear to per-
mit the Parties to incorporate BECCS and other carbon 
dioxide removal options into their NDCs because the term 
26 . IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report, Working Group III, Ch . 6, Assessing 
Transformation Pathways, at 93; Etsushi Kato & Yoshiki Yamagata, BECCS 
Capability of Dedicated Bioenergy Crops Under a Future Land-Use Sce-
nario Targeting Net Negative Carbon Emissions, 2 Earth’s Future 421, 
421 (2014) .
“mitigation” in the NDC provision of Paris encompasses 
both reduction of emissions and enhancement of sinks .
While BECCS could prove to be an important com-
ponent of addressing climate change, it also potentially 
poses serious threats to human rights in terms of some of 
the world’s most vulnerable people . In my chapter, I argue 
that the use of a human rights-based approach could be 
an effective way to operationalize Paris’ human rights lan-
guage and to help protect all realms of interest . Today, I 
will look at the potential human rights ramifications of 
large-scale deployment of BECCS . Then, I will briefly out-
line a human rights-based approach and how it might seek 
to ameliorate any potential impacts on human rights that 
large-scale deployment of BECCS might effectuate .
BECCS could potentially impinge on human rights in 
several ways . First is in the context of the right to food . 
The right to adequate food is established by a number of 
human rights instruments, both at the international level 
and at regional levels . However, large-scale deployment of 
BECCS could contravene this right in several ways . First, 
large-scale deployment of BECCS could require diversion 
of large swaths of agricultural land for bioenergy feed-
stock, which could, in turn, result in large increases in 
food prices for some of the world’s most vulnerable peo-
ples . Even delivery of a relatively modest three gigatons of 
negative emissions from BECCS would require a land area 
of approximately 380 to 700 million hectares, which trans-
lates into 7% to 25% of agricultural land and a whopping 
25% to 46% of arable and permanent crop area .
Several recent studies have indicated that large-scale 
BECCS could result in a net decrease in calories for some 
of the world’s most vulnerable populations because it could 
result in massive increases in food prices . One recent study 
indicated that BECCS, even at the level of five gigatons a 
year, could raise food prices by as much as 25% to 30% . 
For vulnerable populations, which often expend as much 
as 75% to 80% of their income on food, this could prove 
devastating .27 There was empirical evidence of this reality 
when, in 2007, the European Union modestly increased its 
biofuels demands and it resulted in a substantial spike in 
food prices and food riots throughout the world . BECCS 
would be that commitment to biofuels on steroids .
Second, BECCS could potentially contravene the right 
to water, which is recognized in several conventions . More-
over, the United Nations General Assembly recognized this 
right in a resolution in 2010 .28 By 2100, BECCS feedstock 
production at scale would require approximately 10% of the 
current evapotranspiration from all global cropland areas . 
To put this in context, it would be the same magnitude 
of water withdrawals as all current total agricultural water 
withdrawals . This could strain already severely limited 
water resources for millions . It could reduce crop potential, 
27 . Wil Burns & Simon Nicholson, Bioenergy and Carbon Capture With Stor-
age (BECCS): The Prospects and Challenges of an Emerging Climate Policy 
Response, 7 J . Envtl . Studies & Sci . 527, 528 (2017) .
28 . The Human Right to Water, G .A . Res . 64//2962, U .N . GAOR, 64th 
Sess ., U .N . Doc . A/RES/64/292 (2010), http://www .un .org/es/comun/
docs/?symbol=A/RES/64/292&land=E .
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especially in the most vulnerable areas . And it could also 
substantially increase water degradation in many regions of 
the world, including Africa and South America .
Third, BECCS could contravene the right to health . The 
right to health, again, is recognized widely in international 
law . BECCS could undermine this right in several ways . 
First, it could result in substantial diminution of biodi-
versity through habitat destruction associated with carv-
ing out large areas of land for feedstocks, including both 
forest and arable croplands . Recent studies indicated that 
the impact of BECCS in terms of biodiversity could be 
equivalent to raising temperatures by 2 .8 degrees Celsius 
by 2100 .29 Loss of biodiversity could, in turn, undermine 
the right to health by leading to an increase in the trans-
mission of infectious disease by increasing the viability of 
vectors . This could include substantial increases in diseases 
such as hantavirus, Lyme disease, and others . It could also 
undermine health in terms of water contamination, as 
described above .
Finally, BECCS could potentially undermine the 
human rights to subsistence that are recognized under 
international law . BECCS could do this in several ways . 
First, it could result in huge land grabs, as has already 
occurred in many contexts in the association of biofuel 
plantations in areas such as Africa and South America, 
driven largely by European and U .S . demands for biofuels . 
We’ve also seen similar land grabs, often extralegally, in 
the context of REDD (reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion and forest degradation) projects . It is likely that these 
would substantially escalate, given the huge demands for 
feedstocks that BECCS at a level of five to 10-20 gigatons 
would entail . This could undermine vulnerable popula-
tions who rely on such lands for economic subsistence, 
especially forestry resources . Moreover, diminution of bio-
diversity associated with the use of BECCS would deny 
vulnerable populations critical resources that they rely on 
in terms of their livelihoods .
Thus, on a number of different axes, large-scale deploy-
ment of this new technology potentially threatens human 
rights . The question is if there is a way to connect the rather 
vague human rights language in the preamble of the Paris 
Agreement with substantive measures that would ensure 
that these human rights are recognized; and, indeed, if 
BECCS needs to be deployed to protect the world’s cli-
mate in the future, will it be done in a way that will seek 
to ameliorate any potential adverse impacts in terms of 
human rights?
What I argue in the book is that we could potentially 
do this through the development of a human rights-based 
assessment network . The mandate of the Paris Agreement 
could be operationalized by using this human rights-
based approach . The hallmarks of a human rights-based 
approach are several . First, there is a focus on the rela-
tionship between the rights holders and the duty bearers . 
Second, there is an identification of gaps in terms of legis-
29 . Phil Williamson, Scrutinize CO2 Removal Methods, 530 Nature 153, 154 
(2016) .
lation, institutions, policies, and resources that are neces-
sary to ensure recognition and protection of human rights 
with the deployment of new technologies or processes . 
And third, there is a possibility that the most vulnerable 
will have the ability to influence decisions that potentially 
have impacts on their lives, including their human rights . 
I would also add a fourth component, which is a compara-
tive risk assessment of the human rights impacts of BECCS 
in comparison to the human rights impacts of a business-
as-usual scenario in terms of greenhouse gas emissions .
The human rights-based approach has been embraced to 
date by international, national, subnational, governmental, 
and nongovernmental organizations in a wide array of con-
texts, including health, development, and environmental 
protection . Drawing on these guidelines, especially from 
the human rights and development institutions, apply-
ing the human rights-based approach to consideration of 
BECCS should utilize five essential elements .
First, human rights claims of rights holders and corre-
sponding human rights obligations of duty bearers need 
to be identified . It would be critical to recognize who the 
rights holders are . This would include not only those whose 
potential human rights would be impacted by domes-
tic deployment of BECCS, but also those who might be 
impacted in a transboundary context by the deployment 
of BECCS, especially in the context of food prices, as dis-
cussed above .
Second, it would be critical to recognize all of the poten-
tial duty bearers, both those that are domestic, as well as 
those that would be benefiting from BECCS internation-
ally . For example, Parties under the Paris Agreement that 
might seek to partially meet their NDC commitments 
through the use of bioenergy technology should be recog-
nized as rights holders whether BECCS is deployed in their 
country or in another country on which they rely for those 
resources . Also, there would be a need to comprehensively 
characterize the human rights that are potentially contra-
vened by BECCS and their sources, again, both in terms of 
domestic law and international law .
The second component of this element would involve 
assessment of the capacity of rights holders to claim their 
rights and of duty bearers to fulfill their obligations . One 
of the things that we know in the context of bioenergy 
is that there is a very large gap in assessment regarding 
potential impacts of bioenergy deployment in the envi-
ronmental context and the socioeconomic context . This 
will require substantial resources to accurately assess those 
potential impacts and to map them over the course of the 
world’s most vulnerable populations . That is something 
that should be done before any consideration of large-scale 
use of BECCS . It should be incorporated into current pilot 
projects to help us develop and assess before we scale up the 
use of these technologies in the future .
Third, we need prioritization of the rights of the most 
vulnerable groups and individuals . These should include 
not necessarily focusing on the cheapest route to BECCS 
development, which may be the use of food crops for feed-
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stocks, as well as the use of virgin forest . Instead, there 
should be substantial increases in research and develop-
ment on innovations such as lignocellulosic and algae-
based biofuels that would reduce potential impacts on food 
and forest resources . While these strategies may be more 
expensive than utilizing virgin land, they would recognize 
the need to potentially ameliorate human rights impacts in 
terms of the world’s most vulnerable populations .
Fourth, we should avoid developing BECCS projects in 
so-called failing states, where elites may not be interested 
in protecting the rights of the most vulnerable, or where 
protection of these rights would be particularly hard to 
protect given these states’ limited legal resources . This is 
particularly important in the context of BECCS because 
a recent study in the journal Science indicated that 45% 
to 50% of the potential land areas for biofuel feedstocks 
would be in failing states .30 To blithely enter into agree-
ments with the elites in those countries would fly in the 
face of the protection of human rights of the world’s most 
vulnerable populations .
Finally, there is a need for monitoring and evaluation 
of outcomes in terms of human rights . This requires sev-
eral things . It requires a human rights impact assessment 
process, similar to that which would be utilized in an envi-
ronmental impact assessment (EIA) process . Indeed, to 
the extent that virtually all of these projects would require 
EIAs, a human rights assessment process could be folded 
into this process to increase efficiencies and benefit from 
some of the common themes between the two . Moreover, 
it would be critical to have an ongoing monitoring of these 
processes to ensure that human rights are not contravened 
in the future .
In summary, we may reach a point where indeed we 
need to look at what we now characterize as climate geoen-
gineering options, given the feckless response of the world’s 
community to climate change . But one of the things that 
we should try to do is to avoid what has happened today, 
which is visiting the most serious impacts of climate change 
on the world’s most vulnerable . Every effort must be made 
to ensure that the world’s most vulnerable do not suffer 
disproportionately from our responses to climate change . 
BECCS provides us with a good case study in developing 
a framework that will help ensure that this does not occur . 
Potentially, it is a way to put meat on the bones of the Paris 
Agreement’s human rights obligations .
V. Question-and-Answer Session
Audience Member One: Randall, I understand the U .S . 
Department of Justice is thinking about trying to find a 
way to get the Juliana case in the U .S . Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit dismissed . I wondered if you might 
comment on the possibilities there .
30 . Karl-Heinz Erb et al ., Dependency of Global Primary Bioenergy Crop Poten-
tials in 2050 on Food Systems, Yields, Biodiversity Conservation and Political 
Stability, 47 Energy Pol’y 260, 267 (2012) .
Wil, in the case of biofuels, that gets a lot of play in 
climate discussions . But it seems to me that for a long time 
we’ve recognized that the use of land for biofuels is going 
to be very problematic . I’m wondering whether we should 
just de-emphasize biofuels in relationship to wind and solar 
and perhaps other forms of renewable energy .
Randall S. Abate: I just became aware of this develop-
ment last night, so I don’t have a lot to say . But, overall, 
I’m encouraged by the response . I think it shows that the 
government is sufficiently concerned about the potential 
viability of this case . The extensive discovery and informa-
tion that will come out to support the plaintiffs’ case is a 
threat to the government’s interest in refraining from regu-
lation, and destructive to the fossil fuel industries’ interest 
in maintaining a protective veil on what they’re doing and 
not being accountable .
There is a lot more that I look forward to learning 
about in terms of the nature of this because it appears a bit 
unusual to request the appellate court to intervene before 
the case proceeds to trial at the district court .31 I’m at least 
encouraged by the fact that the government looks scared .
Wil Burns: In reference to the question of de-emphasizing 
biofuels, a couple of things . A lot of it depends on how 
quickly you assume that you can increase market pen-
etration in terms of renewables . In the IPCC’s integrated 
assessment models, 116 of them met the 2 degrees Celsius 
goal . All of them contemplated substantially escalating the 
use of renewables in fairly optimum ways in some cases . 
But none of them, or 104 of the 116, could not get to hold-
ing temperatures to below 2 degrees Celsius, and certainly 
not 1 .5 degrees, without substantial use of these negative 
emissions technologies simply because of the huge buildup 
and the inertia of the system .
I have some sympathy for this idea . If you look at where 
we are in terms of the NDCs, if all of the current NDCs 
are implemented absolutely faithfully, we go from 48 giga-
tons per year of carbon to 55 by the year 2030 . Right? 
We’re still going in the wrong direction and that includes 
assumptions of substantial increases and uses of renewable 
energy . So, if we are going to take biofuels off the table 
or other kinds of negative emissions technologies, we are 
really going to have to massively commit to renewables in 
ways that maybe we just won’t .
One of the things that we should be looking at in terms 
of negative emissions technology is funding research and 
development with some of the other forms of negative 
emissions technology so it would be more benign . There is 
something called direct air capture . It is using these ugly 
things called artificial trees that essentially use large filters 
that suck in the ambient air, separate out the carbon diox-
ide, and then store it . Those do not require significant uses 
31 . On June 9, 2017, the U .S . government filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus, asking the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to stay the 
district court proceedings . The motion is still pending . United States v . U .S . 
District Court for District of Oregon, No . 17-71692 (9th Cir .) .
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of land, water, and so on . Those potentially might make 
sense, as could some of the other forms . Right now, we are 
not funding those virtually at all .
The real worry I think with BECCS is—because the 
IPCC assumptions are really baking in an assumption that 
we’re going to have 10 gigatons of BECCS—if we are not 
going to do that, if we are going to conclude that from a 
socioeconomic and justice perspective that it is not viable, 
we need to be making that decision now and escalating 
commitments to renewables, as you suggest .
Audience Member Two: I’m interested about the strategy 
behind an atmospheric trust case versus a case that relies 
on NDCs or policy implementation . In your studies of the 
cases that took these different approaches, do you under-
stand the pros and cons of taking one versus the other, 
kind of constitutional growth versus a policy implementa-
tion? Could you speak more about which one was relevant 
in which case and why you think they took that approach?
Randall S. Abate: The constitutional approach is clearly 
not the easy path to success . I think that is a function of the 
challenge that we face in the United States, that we have 
to be more ambitious, creative, and persistent with our 
legal theories . That is certainly something that offers some 
potential for success . However, outside the environmental 
context, we have a tradition of judicial precedent that was 
essentially a judge-made evolution of constitutional rights 
and values that were not in the original Constitution .
There’s some leverage there for it to be possible . But 
because we have nothing and we’re trying to create some-
thing in terms of a government response, the legal theories 
have to be more ambitious . I think the NDC approach is 
certainly more viable for more short-term success, because 
it is essentially seeking to either enforce what is currently 
not being enforced or to enhance what is not being enforced 
well enough . Maria can speak more to that .
Maria Antonia Tigre: Yes . From a foreign court’s perspec-
tive, I cannot say a lot about the strategy behind it . I do not 
know why they decided to go one way or the other . But I 
think now we have maybe three different ways in which 
climate justice litigation is moving forward in some of the 
countries . The constitutional approach is one of those . I 
think in that case, the goal would be to directly link cli-
mate change to the human rights aspect of that as well, 
which I think in terms of the long-term approach, a long-
term goal is better .
Like Randall said, the policy implementation is more 
short-term, but in a sense maybe easier because it is try-
ing to enhance something that is already there—either a 
law or policy framework that has already been agreed on 
by the government, and therefore trying to improve what 
already exists .
The third trend of cases is trying to target specific proj-
ects as well . There were two decisions earlier this year, one 
in Austria and the other in South Africa, in which they 
used climate change arguments to hold specific private 
projects accountable and they succeeded in that as well .
Patricia Ferreira: Adding to the question about policy ver-
sus judicial approaches, I think that, as Wil mentioned, we 
are still so far away from the targets that we have needed . 
So, we need all of the above . We have seen, so far, what 
the courts can do . The executive and legislative branches 
in key countries are not active enough . Therefore, as we 
think about this strategically, we have to use all tools at our 
disposal . The strategy has to be a multipronged one .
Also, it is very fluid . In the United States, we had a more 
proactive executive for a few years . Now, it is the opposite . 
The emerging economies were trying to drag their feet in 
terms of assuming more responsibility, and now China has 
become a new leader in global climate action . So, there has 
to be flexibility as well with those strategies .
Audience Member Three: This pertains to historical 
cumulative emissions . I think, and correct me if I’m wrong, 
but the numbers you were using were derived by site of pol-
lution, which is the standard way to do it and relatively 
straightforward . Arguably, in a transboundary context, 
when you’re applying the polluter-pays principle, it makes 
sense to move some of the bill with the good for export 
whose economic benefit is going to a receiving country, 
which is of course much harder to do . I recall some work 
on this accounting method six or seven years ago . Is that 
an active part of the discussion on historical responsibility 
now? Is it even a useful point to try to make in the present 
negotiating circumstances?
Patricia Ferreira: That is an interesting question because, 
in fact, how to account is a huge challenge, too . There 
are many attempts . For example, the World Meteorologi-
cal Organization is trying to find ways to check what the 
countries are reporting in terms of their own emissions . 
But there are all of those challenges that you mentioned—
and who should pay the bill? There are questions of trade 
and carbon adjustment, if there is a carbon pricing policy . 
Those are thorny questions .
At the global level, in the negotiations, in the end, it is a 
political compromise on what exactly countries will accept . 
Right now, all those questions have been put aside in a way, 
but they always pop up again in each and every negotia-
tion . So, we are going to see that again in May at the Bonn 
Climate Change Conference Intersessional meeting, and 
we are going to see that again in Bonn at the end of the 
year at the 23rd Conference of the Parties .
The best resource to look at for the state of these discus-
sions is the IPCC reports because they include technical 
discussions and questions and the state of the art of discus-
sions on accounting of carbon emissions and now on the 
distribution as well .
Audience Member Four: My question is related to per-
manent relocation as a climate adaptation strategy, which 
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
12-2017 NEWS & ANALYSIS 47 ELR 11017
many nations and communities are facing . There are a lot 
of climate justifications with that and, to my knowledge, 
there has not been a lot of litigation around this issue 
except for maybe the Kivalina case to try and get dam-
ages to help with the relocation process . Of course, that 
wasn’t successful .
Have any of you thought about the balance between 
policy and legal pathways forward to help some of these 
nations and communities get the resources that they need 
in a way that protects their cultural and indigenous prac-
tices and human rights?
Wil Burns: I think one potential mechanism that is 
underutilized at this point—hopefully it will be utilized 
more—is the loss and damage provision of the Paris Agree-
ment Article 8 . Article 8 contemplates looking at needs for 
permanent relocation efforts to privilege keeping people 
within their countries and protecting economic and cul-
tural patrimony and establishing funding mechanisms to 
ensure that that happens .
I would strongly encourage developing countries to hold 
developed countries to the fire in that context because one 
of the things that they did was essentially give away their 
right to claim liability for damages associated with climate 
change in exchange for this provision . There is a formal 
mechanism and there is a review coming up in terms of the 
adequacy of those measures and what other measures could 
be taken in the future .
Randall S. Abate: There are three chapters in the book 
that address this issue on varying levels . This is a critical 
issue and it has major human rights implications . One of 
the biggest challenges right now is the term “refugees .” It 
is a term that is creating some baggage . The idea falls in 
the void between international environmental protections 
and international human rights protections; the notion of 
climate refugees does not fit the current definition of “refu-
gee” under the Refugee Convention .32
As Wil noted, there is nothing in the Paris Agreement’s 
approach to expressly embrace the rights of the climate-
displaced . It appears that the best short-term solution is 
international funding mechanisms . We have the Green 
Climate Fund . It is not quite where it needs to be in terms 
of robust financial grounding, but, ultimately, to the extent 
we are sending large sums of money from the developed to 
the developing world, estimated at $100 billion per year, it 
is serving a valuable purpose . Part of that funding could be 
earmarked for climate relocation in developing countries . 
It is likely to take place on more of a regional level instead 
of global-to-global kind of support .
I think we are going to see hot spots of climate refugee 
issues in the South Pacific and the Arctic and there might 
be some regional frameworks that could be built up that 
would be much more effective than some kind of interna-
tional climate refugee treaty, which would take a decade 
or more to operationalize . The response to the climate dis-
placement problem is a patchwork right now and is not 
happening fast enough .
Rachel Jean-Baptiste: Thank you, speakers, and thank 
you all for joining us .
32 . Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U .N .T .S . 150 (entered 
into force Apr . 22, 1954) .
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